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Abstract 
It is well reported in the literature that more than 80% of shipping accidents are attributed to Human/organisational Error. 
Maritime community has realised that despite all the increased safety standards and technological developments, accidents are 
still occurring and the systems are not resilient to errors at various levels. The FP7 SEAHORSE project focuses on safety in 
marine transport by addressing human and organisational factors through transfer of well proven practices and methodologies 
from air transport to marine transport in an effective, collaborative and innovative manner. This will be primarily achieved by 
introducing the principles of resilience engineering in an integrated framework which will result in multi-level resilience that 
linking individuals, team, multi-party teams and organisations in ship operation that ultimately enhancing shipping safety. 
This paper presents similarities and gaps between two transport sectors while establishing the principles of transfer of skills, 
technology from aviation to maritime, which includes but not limited to rules, standard operating procedures, safety culture, just 
culture and mandatory safety reporting methodologies. The paper further present the feasible areas for transfer, experience gained 
during the transfer of technology/skills from air to marine while outlining the resilience framework adapted to maritime transport. 
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1. Introduction 
Currently while an increase in the transportation of goods worldwide by sea has been recorded, a general 
decrease in the number of crew on-board has been observed over a number of years. Due to system automation, 
operational streamlining and financial constraints extra demands have been placed on the smaller crew which has 
the potential to lead to situations conducive to human error and accidents. The modern seaman is expected to be 
multi-disciplined with a high level of technical skills, have broader deck officer responsibilities, manoeuvre the 
vessel he/she is working on at short notice and be prepared to work long hours with very limited days off and 
outside social contact. These working conditions and this environment are proven not only to be making seafaring 
a less attractive career option but more worryingly causing accidents. 
It is well reported in the literature that more than 80% of shipping accidents are attributed to Human Error. 
Marine accidents are the result of error chains rather than single events (Swift, 2004). Traditionally safety has been 
addressed both by designers and regulatory bodies such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) through 
structural, mechanical, electrical and technological solutions with the aim of minimising damage and prevention of 
loss of life and ships/floating structures. Maritime community has realised that despite all the increased safety 
standards and technological developments, accidents are still occurring and the system is not resilient to errors at 
various levels. Furthermore, it has been often ignored that the human element of the maritime system has not been 
evolving in the same way that technology is developing; with the physical capabilities and the limitations of the 
human being overlooked. 
The air transport sector, which is in many ways similar to the marine sector have been facing similar human and 
organisational factors that affect operational safety. However the airline industry has been managing these issues by 
approaching the same problem systematically and developing much more advanced methodologies and techniques 
that can be adapted to the marine industry while utilising the experience of air transport. 
The SEAHORSE project addresses human factors and safety in marine transport by transferring the well proven 
practices and methodologies from air transport to marine transport in an effective, collaborative and innovative 
manner. This is to be primarily achieved by introducing the principles of resilience engineering and smart 
procedures methodology in an integrated framework which will result in multi-level resilience that linking 
individuals, team, multi-party teams and organisations in ship operation that ultimately enhancing shipping safety. 
The resilience will be realised by 
? Identifying the key human/organisational factors, which lead to operational successes and failures in marine and 
air transport and perform gap analysis in marine practices in comparison to air industry;  
? Investigate how errors and non-standard practices were managed successfully in air transport and check the 
feasibility of applying best practices and resilience concept adopted in air transport for marine to improve 
human/organisational errors and safety 
? Develop the Technology Transfer Framework from air to marine for successful implementation  
? Introduce a smart procedure methodology in marine operations to manage non-standard procedures carried out on 
board ships to enhance overall resilience. 
? Develop and validate a multi-level resilience model which encompasses individual, team, multi-party and 
organisational resilience that linked and integrated.  
Seahorse concepts takes into account a)  The crew needs and limitations that may affect their resilience with 
regards to navigation/operation of the ships (competency, physical & cognitive limits, attitudes, team composition), 
b) System design, equipment and procedures which promote/add/remove, by designing resilient systems and 
behaviour; c) Shared situational awareness, leadership, organisational drift, insufficient/non-existing safety culture, 
team work. 
This paper presents project outputs so far by presenting the comparative state-of-art analysis between air and 
marine transport modes, occurrence analysis, gap analysis and scope of transfer in sections 2, 3,4 and 5 respectively. 
Workarounds in maritime sector and Multilevel Resilience Framework are presented in sections 6 and 7.  
© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Road and Bridge Research Institute (IBDiM)
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2. Comparative state-of-the-art between air and marine transport 
2.1. Stakeholders 
The review of stakeholders highlighted the fact that the two transport sectors are very different. Both have 
a strong emphasis on safety but there are differences in how safety is managed and negotiated by the main actors. 
The maritime sector, in the category of secondary users, contrasts strongly with the aviation sector. The maritime 
sector has a much more broad and varied category of secondary users. The aviation sector has ATM, maintenance 
and airport services to manage in terms of secondary stakeholders. But the maritime sector has not just the maritime 
equivalent of ATM (VTS), or maintenance and the port but stakeholders such as agents, towage companies, pilot 
companies, stevedoring, ship owners, etc. all of whom have inputs to the safety and reliability of the operation.. 
Safety and efficiency are often opposing forces and compromises often have to be made. Negotiation safety with so 
many stakeholders with varied agendas, as happens in the maritime sector, is a task which is complicated by training 
and regulatory issues. 
2.2. Training 
The aviation sector can be broadly said to have better systems and procedures in place to oversee, assess and 
ensure the currency of personnel training. One particular example is Human Factor (HF) training. HF training in the 
maritime sector is only mandated for certain grades of staff. While most of the same topics are covered in aviation 
HF training as in maritime, the fact that only certain grades receive the training means that its potential impact on 
the system functioning is decreased. The aviation sector is assisted in managing training by regulations which state 
the AMC (Acceptable Means of Compliance) whereby the regulators state what they view as an acceptable means of 
implementing the regulations and rules. Similarly, while the aviation sector struggles to effectively assess and 
evaluate training it does have in place systems to do this and is trying to improve. The maritime sector however, 
seems to not have attempted this yet. 
2.3. Regulations 
Both the maritime and aviation sectors are highly regulated industries but it is clear that oversight and the 
interpretation and implementation of regulations are an area where the maritime sector could learn from the aviation 
sector. The lack of a mandatory quality approval system for Flag States is creating a big safety discrepancy between 
the potential and actual safety of the maritime system. While the maritime sector seems to tolerate this systemic 
safety ‘workaround’ the aviation system is far less tolerant of safety ‘fudges’. Indeed the EU and US aviation safety 
regulators have the power to ban airlines that fail to meet their stringent safety requirement from even entering 
European airspace. This ‘blacklist’ is publicly available and regularly updated. It is clear that aviation, as a safety 
critical transport sector, has to be ‘seen’ to be safe (in addition to actually ‘being’ safe) and can derive commercial 
value from being ‘seen’ by the travelling public as safe but the regulations are far more reaching and stringent in 
terms of holding operators to account. Oversight of safety is one key area where the maritime sector could achieve 
key gains in learning from aviation – not just in terms of enforcing regulations but in assisting organizations in 
understanding how to meet safety requirements (such as the aviation AMC approach) and in terms of supporting 
organizations to implement and monitor the effectiveness of safety initiatives. 
2.4.  Challenges 
In relation to current challenges there are areas of convergence and divergence between the two sectors. Both the 
maritime and aviation interviewees have stated those paperwork and task loads are very important challenges for 
their operations. In the aviation sector workload has sometimes been decreased due to automation on the flight deck, 
whereas in the maritime sector the paperwork on the bridge is reported to increase the workload. Paperwork in the 
aviation sector is also an issue but here the challenges with paperwork relate to inaccurate documentation, illegible 
data cards and out of date maintenance data. Similarly both sectors see challenges related to the organisational 
context – specifically the lack of resources in the aviation sector which has an impact on competence (insufficient 
training) or task performance (lack of equipment, inadequate facilities etc.), though the industry is trying to manage 
this through audit plans and regular reporting. In the maritime sector one issue is the compartmentalisation of safety 
where it is viewed as separate from the operation and not related to everyday work. This leads to the notion that 
safety is somebody else’s problem and results in a diffusion of responsibility for safety. Meanwhile there is 
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convergence in relation to multicultural crews. The maritime sector cites this as a significant challenge whereas the 
aviation sector states that it is not a safety challenge as standard operating procedures constitute a good solution for 
avoiding possible issues that can come up due to multicultural issues. Clearly the strong professional culture of 
pilots, or maintenance personnel, and their common (standardized) training produces a more consistent basis for 
a common professional culture than exists in the maritime sector. Finally, the issue of resources is again one of the 
greatest issues in aviation. The lack of resources can most of the times lead to a lack of knowledge (not enough 
trainings), inadequate facilities, lack of equipment and lack of personnel. The main results can be safety issues and 
quality issues. Some measures taken by the airline industry are the monitoring through an audit plan in order to 
improve possible inadequacy of resources and the regular reporting of the personnel to their managers. 
3. Occurrence Analysis 
“Occurrence Analysis” provides an overview of accidents and incidents which commonly occur in the maritime 
and aviation industry and therefore contributes to the overall aims of the SEAHORSE project by highlighting the 
key areas where failures occur and helps form the basis for developing an understanding about whether there is 
a way of adopting best practices to improve safety. The analysis of accident and incident data was conducted by 
using publicly available occurrence data, data from the end-users of the consortium, other stakeholders and reviews 
of other occurrences analysis, particularly in the aviation industry. Particular attention was given to human errors, 
operating procedures and organisational issues. Further interviews and expert opinions were collated to confirm the 
findings as well as to provide deeper insight into the dynamics of failure.  
3.1. Occurrence reporting procedures 
Aviation: Aviation has a standardised mandatory occurrence reporting system as International Civil Aviation 
Authority, ICAO Annex 13 (Chapter 8) requires States to establish mandatory incident reporting systems to gather 
information on actual or potential safety deficiencies. This requirement is supplemented by further ICAO 
requirements which require aviation companies to have in place formal processes to collect, analyse and act upon 
feedback on hazards and risks in operations in order to support the implementation of mandated safety management 
systems. In Europe mandatory occurrence reporting, which has existed since 2003 (Directive 2003/42/EC), was 
supplemented in 2007 with implementing rules establishing a Central European Repository of information on civil 
aviation occurrences (Regulation (EC) 1321/2007). It contains all occurrences collected by EU Member States, and 
rules on the dissemination of the information stored in the European Central Repository (Regulation (EC) 
1330/2007). In process of Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) activity, Aviation industry is using same 
taxonomy and procedure. MORs received by the CAA are all coded under the ECCAIRS data definition standards 
which use the ICAO ADREP Taxonomy.  
Maritime: The maritime sector has not reached the maturity level of aviation despite the efforts within the IMO, 
and different authorities use different taxonomies to guide the collection of data. Additionally there are significant 
variations in the standards of reporting. This creates a significant problem with regards to the creation of a single 
maritime occurrence reporting taxonomy as well as a centralised database. The European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA) is currently making efforts to create a centralised database using a standardised taxonomy to gather data 
but this objective may not be easily realised given the safety maturity level of the maritime sector and the dominant 
safety culture that exists. This is one of the key areas as a potential topic for the transfer of best practices from 
aviation to enhance occurrence reporting in the maritime sector  
3.2. Availability and similarity of data 
In aviation reports of single accidents are publicly available in Agency databases (e.g. NTSB-AAR, European 
Central Repository). However, more in depth information on the contributing factors is classified and only 
accessible by authorized national agencies to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.  
The SEAHORSE Consortium managed to obtain a comprehensive accident review from the UK CAA containing 
important information on human and organisational factors which could be considered comparable to the MAIB 
database used for the maritime analysis. A direct like-for-like comparison across categories and/or levels of human 
and organisational factors was not possible due to the fact that the CAA and the MAIB use different frameworks to 
categorise accidents and incidents. Aviation and maritime are two transport sectors with different levels of safety 
maturity and it stands to reason that they have emerged using different classification schemes for accident and 
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incident data. So, while a direct comparison cannot be made, the data were sufficiently rich to give us insights into 
the incidence of human and organisational issues in the maritime sector as compared to aviation.  
3.3. Occurrence Analysis 
Maritime: According to the European Transport safety Council, passenger fatality rates in shipping are 
14.8 passengers per 100 million passenger hours and 0.46 per 100 million passenger kilometres. The data obtained 
from the MAIB (Maritime Accident Investigation Branch) was analysed under three levels: Underlying accident 
factor category, underlying accident factor and underlying accident sub-factor. It was found that the majority of the 
factors leading to accident is related to the human factor category (74% of the underlying main factors) while 26% 
are listed under the technical category. For each accident there are more than one root cause recorded in the MAIB 
database. Therefore, it is very common that the number of accident sub-factors is higher than the actual number of 
accidents. This confirms the view in the maritime and aviation domains that accidents are results of a chain of events 
rather than a single point failure. 
Under the human factors category, when underlying accident factors are analysed it can be seen that over 50% of 
the underlying accident factors under the human factors category are related to ‘people’ and their poor performance. 
The second largest group is ‘system-crew factors’ (15%). ‘System-company and organisation’ percentage is 9%, 
which is followed by ‘working environment’ (8%) and ‘system-equipment’ (8%). All safety-related issues on board 
are directly influenced by the company that the vessel belongs to. Therefore management factors are recognised as 
extremely important and should form a core element of the resilience framework. 
When the underlying sub-factors under the ‘people’ category are analysed it reveals that inattention was found as 
the cause of the majority of the accidents reported. Inattention results as the main cause leading to human error 
(19%) while perception of risk (9.3%) is the second most frequent underlying sub-factor of ‘people’ related to 
marine accidents. 8.8% of human errors are caused by inadequate communication or situational awareness and 8.1% 
of human related errors are caused by perception abilities. 6% are caused by complacency and 5.8% by the 
competence of people. Under the ‘system-crew’ factor, 42% of the underlying sub-factors are related to inadequate 
procedures which may be misleading or may give insufficient information. This is followed by lack of 
communication or coordination between crew members with 18%. These occurrence analyses clearly highlight the 
gaps in various areas, which are related to human and organisational issues.  
Aviation: The Global Fatal Accident Review 2002 to 2011 was carried out to provide a ten-year overview of 
worldwide fatal accidents involving large jet and turboprop aeroplanes engaged in passenger, cargo and 
ferry/positioning flights (CAA, 2013). There were a total of 250 worldwide fatal accidents, which resulted in 
7,148 fatalities to passengers and crewmembers on-board the aircraft. The proportion of aircraft occupants killed in 
these fatal accidents was 70% which indicates that, on average, 30% of occupants survived. The overall fatal 
accident rate for the ten-year period from 2002 to 2011 was 0.6 fatal accidents per million flights flown or 0.4 when 
expressed as per million hours flown. The corresponding on-board fatality rate for the same period was 
22.0 fatalities per million flights flown or 12.7 when expressed as per million hours flown. According to European 
Transport safety Council, passenger fatality rates in aviation is 0.035 per 100 million passenger kilometres. Factors 
related to the human element are by far the main explanatory factor, in view of the data submitted to the UK CAA´s 
Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR). 
 
? Over half of all fatal accidents (52%) involved an “Airline (human and organisational factors)” related primary 
causal group. Other causal groups are listed as environment (5%), aircraft system/components (5%), engine (4%) 
and maintenance (2%).  
? The most frequently identified primary causal factor was “Flight Crew Handling/Skill – Flight handling” (14% of 
all fatal accidents).  
? 66% of all fatal accidents involved at least one ‘Airline’ related causal factor. In addition to “Flight handling”, 
“Omission of action or inappropriate action” (12%) was the joint most-commonly assigned causal factor. 
? “Omission of action or inappropriate action” generally related to flight crew continuing their descent below the 
decision height or minimum descent/safety heights without visual reference, failing to fly a missed approach or 
omitting to set the correct aircraft configuration for take-off. 
? Nearly 40% of all fatal accidents involved some kind of loss of control, making this the most frequent type of 
accident. Non-technical failures (for example flight crew failing to correctly respond to a warning) were the 
predominant cause of loss of control accidents. 
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4. Gap analysis between air and marine transport 
The SEAHORSE gap analysis is related to the gaps that exist between maritime and aviation. In a workshop with 
maritime and aviation attendees the topics and sub-topics were discussed and a joint decision was made about the 
existence of otherwise of a gap. The criterion for stating that a gap exists was that the gap should have an impact on 
safety. It was not a statement of difference between the maritime and aviation systems.  
Following the workshop a total of 44 gaps were identified which impact safety in the maritime sector (Table 1). 
This is the first such study clearly providing the gaps between the air and maritime transport with regards to safety.  
Table 1. Gaps identified between Air and maritime sectors. 
A-Stakeholders E-Current Challenges 
1. Standardisation 
2. Passenger focus 
3. Complicating role of ship owner 
4. Fragmentation 
5. VTS authority 
6. Transnational regulation 
7. Flag states 
8. Operationalisation of training regulations 
9. Standardisation of training 
29. Application of workspace guidelines 
30. Fatigue (including physical fatigue) 
31. Multicultural/language issues 
32. Paperwork 
B-Functional Demands F-Human and Organizational Factors 
10. Human Machine Interface 
11. Crewmember procedures 
12. Language stills 
13. Maintenance during operation 
14. Command conflict (maintenance) 
15. Lack of certification 
16. Procedures vs qualification 
33. Advanced tackling of HOF issues 
C-Training G-Operational Demands 
17. Maturity & capability of HF training 
18. Maturity & capability of HF training 
19. Reluctance to report 
20. Lack of standardised training 
21. Limited use of simulations 
34. Standardisation 
35. Experience and regulations 
36. Input of captain to planning 
37. Lack of mandatory maneuvering advice 
38. Maturity & capability of reporting 
D-Regulations H-Socio-Economic Issues 
22. Centralised Framework 
23. Flags of convenience 
24. The finance and quality of seafarer/crew training 
25. Scope of Personnel Licensing 
26. Responsibilities in traffic control 
27. Standardisation 
28. The scope of regulations for maintenance 
39. Lack of proper rest hours 
40. Length of time away 
41. Social benefits 
42. Health and safety 
43. Training costs 
44. Social perception 
4.1. Standardisation 
Standardisation is one such gap – featuring as it does in the stakeholder topic. Aviation is far more standardised 
compared to maritime. Even just taking the example of vessels and aircraft, it is far easier to regulate, control and 
manage a system which has standardized vessels compared to one which has no easy means of comparison or 
predicting outcomes where variables are not standardized in any knowable way. In aviation, rank structure is 
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informed by licenses as crew (flight crew and maintenance crew) have licenses for a particular aircraft ‘type’ 
(a particular ‘brand’ of aircraft series produced by a particular manufacturer) and their experience is represented by 
this license. In maritime, the rank structure within a ship’s hierarchy is key and without a license related to particular 
vessel it renders rank structure particularly strong as a cultural artefact – and indeed rank structure often creates 
barriers to communication 
4.2. Commercialisation of safety 
Maritime is predominantly a cargo transport sector (though this is changing). Aviation is predominantly 
a passenger transport sector. While the human factors discipline has continually failed to demonstrate the monetary 
impact or benefit of safety initiatives in aviation, safety continues to be a driver for technological and organisational 
improvement. That is to say, without evidence of improvements to efficiency (even though most safety experts 
legitimately suggest that improving safety will concomitantly improve safety) aviation companies are still willing to 
invest in safety initiatives. This is because not only does safety have a commercial value in aviation but also airlines 
want to be seen to do ‘safety’. Airlines want to have a reputation for pursuing safety objectives in a sustained and 
rigorous way. This is different to the way safety is managed in the maritime sector and the question as to whether it 
relates to the capability of the maritime sector to manage intractable safety issues or the maturity of the maritime 
system needs to be teased out. What remains, however, is that for aviation safety has a commercial value – 
passengers question the safety record of an airline before they book (thereby giving ‘safer’ airlines a competitive 
advantage), but the maritime sector (being predominantly a cargo transport sector) is different. Clearly as cruising 
grows – and with high profile maritime accidents occurring in recent times – attention will shift in maritime and 
safety will begin to have a commercial value. 
4.3. Economic pressures 
So while it is predicted that the maritime sector will move the way of the aviation sector in terms of how safety is 
viewed as a competitive advantage it would seem that aviation, motivated by economic pressures, is in some 
respects following the maritime sector’s lead and not making positive progress. In some ways aviation is moving 
backwards with the operational ‘innovations’ being spearheaded by budget airlines. Nowadays pilots only get paid 
for the hours they fly (in the past the salary was fixed irrespective of hours flown). This creates pressure on pilots, 
who have had to pay for their initial training, to earn as much money as possible to pay off the debts they 
accumulated to finance their flight training. This has created a situation where pilots are operating on the upper limit 
of their flight time limits and is introducing risk into the system as pilots must not fly longer than stipulated by 
regulations and could, foreseeably, lead to emergency landings if a flight accrued a delay and pushed the pilot over 
his flight time limits. Situations like this have already happened due to budget airlines’ fuel policies – limiting the 
amount of fuel reserves an aircraft holds due to costs which then precipitates an emergency landing when the flight 
accumulates a delay. 
In Europe, aviation regulation requires that the airline companies are obliged to provide training of its crew. Such 
explicit regulatory statement is not found in the maritime industry. Only a few airlines, usually budget airlines as 
well as small aviation companies handling goods transport, require the pilots to pay for the initial training 
themselves. But this is changing and aviation has an emerging safety challenge which might have implications for 
regulation and operations. 
5. Scope of transfer 
Resilience solutions available in airlines are for the first time compiled into a database with an aim of transferring 
the solutions from air transport to maritime sector with the involvement of practising maritime experts as well as 
safety managers. The experts ranked the solutions based on the potential benefits that they can bring to maritime 
sector in the area of operational safety through human and organisational resilience. Maritime experts had a regular 
face to face meetings, discussions and workshops with safety managers, pilots and trainers from air transport 
industry while listening to other maritime experts coming from different branches of maritime sectors such as LNG, 
oil tanker and cruise ship operators. Such a large participation of industry experts from both domains provided 
a platform where practical elements of the resilience solutions were discussed and analysed thoroughly resulting in 
more realistic expectations and strategies for maritime domain.  
The SEAHORSE methodology employed to shortlist and ranks the resilience resources is based on a subjective 
evaluation made by maritime professionals and experts. The evaluation criteria were defined in order to assess 
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clearly the potential applicability of the proposed solutions to the maritime domain. Three criteria were defined as; 
Availability: presence of the solution or something similar in the domain, even if not properly working; 
Applicability: ease of applicability of the proposed solution to the maritime domain and; Impact on Safety: safety 
benefits resulting from the implementation of the proposed solution. 
In addition to these parameters, the maritime experts were also asked to select the most promising solutions to be 
transferred to the maritime domain according to their own judgment, without referring to any specific criteria. This, 
together with the explanation of the rationale for their choice, allowed the final shortlisting and ranking. After 
carrying out workshops with maritime professionals, the final step of the evaluation process was to ask the maritime 
experts to rank the 10 most promising solutions that emerged from the workshops. The criteria of these ranking was 
the benefit that the solution would bring to the maritime domain according to their judgment. On the basis of the 
outcomes of the above process the solutions contained in the database were classified and divided into six 
categories, each one defined by specific criteria. Here the most relevant three are described as; 
1. Most promising solutions: this category includes solutions not available (or not working) that are ranked as 
the most promising for transfer by at least 30% of experts, very much beneficial for maritime safety by at least 
50% with a high impact on safety.  
2. Promising solutions: this category includes solutions not widely available (or not working) that are ranked as 
the most promising for transfer by at least 20% of experts, very much beneficial for maritime safety by at least 
50% with a moderate impact on safety. 
3. Promising solutions to be further investigated: this category includes the solutions evaluated as promising 
in terms of safety impact but already existing in the maritime domain.  
Table 2. Most promising solutions. 
Most promising solutions 
Name Topic Short description 
HF Training – Maintenance Training Maintenance operators training on HF issues in everyday tasks. 
Mandatory Safety Reports Data Structured EU reporting system for all aircraft accidents and serious incidents. 
MEDA Regulations & 
Procedures 
Structured investigation process for maintenance technicians and inspectors error 
causes. 
TCAS Automation Traffic alert and collision avoidance system implemented on aircraft, final barrier 
to avoid mid-air collisions. 
Human Factors analysis and 
classification system 
Incident 
investigation 
Support tool for HF investigation process and consequent operators HF training. 
SAGAT Human Factors Technique for the objective measure of operators Situation Awareness. 
Just culture Human Factors Organisational approach on the management of blame and punishment of not-
deliberated actions and errors.  
Flight time limitation scheme Human Factors Specification of flight and duty time limitations. 
Safety culture Human Factors Organisational commitment to safety, at all levels in the organisation.  
Promising solutions 
Name Topic Short description 
Integrated Safety Trend Analysis and 
Reporting System 
Data Web-based combination of safety-related datasets for an effective and integrated 
safety analysis. 
Safety bulletins Data Periodical bulletins to inform operators on the status of the industry, on most 
frequent safety occurrences and corrective actions. 
Accidents/Incidents investigation Regulations & 
Procedures 
Structured approach for accident or incident data collection and investigation. 
Being a safe crew Training Organisational processes to ensure that every operator shares the same approach 
to safety. 
Fatigue risk management Human Factors Data-driven means of continuously monitoring and maintaining fatigue related 
safety risks. 
Design for maintainability Design Implementation of HF principles during the aircraft design phase, to reduce the 
possibility of human error in maintenance tasks. 
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Out of 166 solutions included in the database 73 were classified in the first four categories while the others were 
excluded. Within the first 4 categories, 9 solutions were classified as most promising, 6 as promising, 10 as 
promising to be further investigated and 48 as “nice to have”.  
6. Workarounds 
During on-board ship operations it is well accepted that crew members may deviate from the standard operating 
procedures due to practical and other reasons. This is called a ‘workaround’ and is directly related to individual 
resilience which potentially affects the overall reliability of ship operations. The main aim is to create a bespoke 
“SEAHORSE Smart procedure Methodology” for capturing and assessing the practice of performing workarounds 
as well as the potential positive and negative outcomes of the workarounds and finally managing the workarounds to 
improve ship safety through a structured workaround management procedure.  
In order to identify and capture the workarounds, the first task was initially to gather the standard procedures and 
perform a mapping study to assign the captured standard procedures to different job ranks. The subsequent task was 
to develop a structured questionnaire to capture the workarounds as well as the standard operating procedures. The 
questionnaire was distributed worldwide including shipping companies, seafarers associations, and crew agencies as 
well as through web based systems) to identify and capture the workarounds. This questionnaire is believed to be the 
first questionnaire related to capture the workarounds in Maritime. 
The first section of the questionnaire aimed to collect demographic information about the participants while 
ensuring the anonymity of participants. The second section focused on capturing the attitudes of a seafarer where 
participants were asked to agree or disagree with the given statements by using a Likert Scale. (i.e never, rarely, 
some-times, often, always). In this section attitude statements were carefully selected and categorised in following 
sections; procedure design, training and competence, safety culture, employee – employer trust, matching 
procedures to operational reality. In total this section has 48 questions. The third section asked, in an open-ended 
format, questions related to workarounds as follows; description of workaround, related standard operating 
procedure (SOP), frequency, type of operation, underlying reason for the workaround.  
6.1. Initial results 
The consortium managed to capture 451 questionnaires in a very sensitive and controversial area and 
259 workarounds and all these data are captured in a database. More than 65% of participants who joined our survey 
reported workarounds and 65% of the workarounds reported stated that most or all crew members do the same 
workaround. More than 50% of workarounds were reported in deck operations while most workarounds reported are 
applicable to whole ship followed by Engine room and Navigation/communication control space workarounds. The 
workaround were categorized under 108 group of workaround. Initial scan of the survey indicated that the most 
common workarounds are located in the areas of reporting paperwork, personal protective equipment, Work-Rest 
hours, navigational rules and standards, and Hot-Work and permit to work. 
7. Multilevel Resilience Framework 
Resilience is the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and 
disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations even after a major mishap. In Resilience Engineering, failures 
do not stand for a breakdown or malfunctioning of normal system functions, but rather represent the converse of the 
adaptations necessary to cope with the real world complexity. Individuals and organizations must always adjust their 
performance to the current conditions; and because resources and time are finite it is inevitable that such 
adjustments are approximate. Success has been ascribed to the ability of individuals, groups, and organizations to 
anticipate the changing shape of risk before damage occurs; failure is simply the temporary or permanent absence of 
that.  
In order for the operational procedures on board to be able to deal successfully with safety critical operations and 
harsh environments; system resilience is required. Resilience is subdivided into four abilities which are considered 
as the functional cornerstones (Hollnagel, 2011). These are Anticipate: events beyond current operation, applying 
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a broader perspective; Monitor: know what to focus on, be able to perceive significant change in performance and 
environment, using valid lead indicators; React: detect, recognize and assess events in time, know when and how to 
react, having resources available and ready; Learn: promote, facilitate and enhance learning from both good and 
bad experiences. Once the system is developed multi-level resilience principles will improve the safety in maritime 
domain through management of errors for any operational demands. This part of the work is still under 
development. 
 
Fig. 1. SEAHORSE Multi Level Resilience Matrix. 
8. Conclusions 
Seahorse project addresses the safety in maritime sector by transferring the best practices in airline sector to 
maritime sector by using the multi-level resilience principles. This paper presents the initial results of Seahorse 
project and highlighted that there are gaps between both air and marine sector in around 44 areas. Furthermore, 
resilience solutions were generated in a database. First time, a workaround survey is performed and type of 
workarounds are captured in maritime were identified. Seahorse project demonstrates that best practices in one 
transport sector can be shared and adapted to different transport sectors to enhance the safety.  
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